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Social security and other public transfer programs aimed at improving the wel-
fare of the elderly have been well established in all Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. A secondary goal of public
support programs for older individuals has been to open job opportunities for
younger individuals by encouraging earlier retirement of older workers. This
kind of program has been explicitly tried in several European countries, includ-
ing the United Kingdom. In part as a result of the adoption of better social
support for older people, the age of full retirement from the labor force has
fallen substantially in the OECD, and there is some debate as to whether the
programs have encouraged the retirement of too many individuals who would
prefer to continue working.
1 There is also an argument that these programs
have exacerbated unemployment problems for older workers through the cre-
ation of work disincentives.
2
This paper examines some of the outcomes of public assistance programs
for the middle-aged and older individual that have been adopted in three coun-
tries in the OECD: the United States, Japan, and Sweden. I address the ques-
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tion of whether the growth of these programs has discouraged economic flexi-
bility by encouraging older individuals to either retire early or to remain in the
state of unemployment during downturns in the business cycle. In particular, I
examine fluctuations in employment and participation rates for different demo-
graphic groups over the business cycle and look for evidence that these fluctu-
ations have become more severe since the expansion of benefits during the
1960s and early 1970s. I also look directly at how participation in benefits of
such programs varies with economic conditions.
I have chosen these three countries because of their widely differing institu-
tions in the labor market, because of their different ideological orientations
toward social protection programs, and also because they face the common
challenge of a rapidly aging labor force. In addition, all three countries share
the feature that they have responded relatively well, by European standards, to
the economic circumstances of the 1970s and 1980s, so that failing economic
performance is less likely to be a concern for this study.
The countries differ substantially in the kinds of social programs that have
been developed to support earlier retirement. The United States saw the intro-
duction of an early retirement program as early as 1961 (1956 in the case of
women). Since that time, most of the initiative in encouraging earlier retire-
ment has come through changes in the provisions of private employee pension
plans. Sweden is notable for its introduction in 1976 of a partial pension pro-
gram designed to encourage partial retirement, a program that has been a
model for other European countries. Sweden had also relaxed the qualifica-
tions necessary for receipt of disability benefits in the early 1970s. In the Japa-
nese case, the age of normal retirement is 60, rather than 65, as it is in the other
two countries.
In this study, I propose to examine the extent to which various government
labor market programs, including early retirement programs, are used by older
individuals in response to economic fluctuations. I begin section 7.1 of the
paper with a brief survey of the different government labor market programs
used in each of three countries. Section 7.2 provides an overview of the condi-
tions for mature and older workers by examining secular trends in labor force
participation rates, unemployment rates, and indicators of well-being in the
three countries. Section 7.3 looks at cyclical movements in participation and
employment over the business cycle. Time series analysis of participation and
employment is used to show the relative responsiveness of different demo-
graphic groups in the labor force. Section 7.4 then looks at the response during
subperiods within each country to see how the cyclical response of employ-
ment of older demographic groups has changed over time as the social pro-
grams have grown and matured. In section 7.5, I present direct evidence on
changes in the participation rates in public benefits over the business cycle,
and in section 7.6,1 offer conclusions.191 Social Security and Older Workers' Labor Market Responsiveness
7.1 Social Security Programs for the Mature and Older:
Institutional Description
All countries in the OECD have developed public pension systems (known
in the United States as Social Security) for the purpose of ensuring economic
security for the elderly.
3 Although there were existing pension systems for
parts of the labor force, Sweden introduced a national pension system in 1913,
the United States introduced Social Security in 1935, and Japan developed its
National Pension System in 1946. The existence of social security systems on
paper, however, may have very little potential impact on labor supply. Instead,
it is the size of the benefits, the extent of coverage of the population, and the
conditions for benefit eligibility that influence aggregate behavior for specific
demographic groups. Benefits may reduce labor supply through (1) the income
effect of increased lifetime unearned wealth and (2) the substitution effect if
benefits are reduced by working. This is particularly true of unemployment
insurance and public pension systems that include an earnings test.
In general, the level of benefits, the extent of coverage, and the eligibility
for benefits at earlier ages all increased over time in all three countries. It is
this consistent trend that will allow me to test for changes in labor supply
behavior caused by growth in the social insurance system. I begin this section
with a brief summary of the different benefits and eligibility conditions in the
three countries. I then describe the changes in the level of benefits and the
extent of coverage over time. Finally, I look briefly at the effects of private
pension plans and at the public pension financing arrangements on the labor
market.
7.1.1 Public Economic Security Programs
Table 7.1 provides a summary description of the principal forms of public
benefits, including unemployment insurance offered to older individuals, in
each of the three countries. (A more comprehensive description of the different
programs is provided in appendix A.) Here I list the main points that are partic-
ularly important in distinguishing the programs offered.
1. The United States offers the least variety in the way of programs targeted
for its older workers. Unemployment insurance (UI) benefits are only available
if one is dismissed from one's job. The normal age of retirement under the
Social Security system is 65, but since 1956 and 1962 an early retirement op-
tion has been available for women and men, respectively, at age 62. Early re-
tirement involves a reduction in the lifetime annuity and also includes an earn-
ings test that reduces the benefit if the individual continues to work.
3. Throughout this paper, all income figures are evaluated at 1990 levels and converted to U.S.
dollars, using the purchasing power parity index for consumption goods developed by the OECD
for the year 1990. These levels may be found in OECD (1992b), table 2.5, row 1. Gross domestic
product (GDP) deflators used were: United States—Economic Report of the President, 1992, table
B-3; Japan and Sweden—World Bank, World Tables 1992, pp. 348-49 and 576-77, respectively.192 Marcus E. Rebick
Table 7.1 Public Early Retirement and Disability Schemes in the United States, Japan,
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Sources: United States and Sweden: Excerpted from Mirkin (1987), exhibit 1, and augmented from appen-
dix 1. Japan: appendix A (this paper).
'In 1983, eligibility age for full retirement benefits was raised from 65 to 67.
2In 1983, the early retirement reduction in benefits claimed at age 62 was raised from 20 percent to 30
percent, to be phased in gradually between 2002 and 2027.
365%, except for 1981-1987, where it was 50 percent.
2. Sweden offers the largest spectrum of different kinds of assistance pro-
grams, including an old-age pension with a normal retirement age of 65 (67
before 1976) and an early retirement option with actuarially reduced benefits
and, unlike the United States, no earnings test. Other programs include partial
pensions (up to 65 percent replacement of lost earnings for reduced working
hours since 1976); liberal unemployment benefits (up to 90 percent replace-
ment rate for 450 days); labor market assistance (smaller unemployment insur-
ance benefits that are available after regular benefits run out) up through age
65, since 1971. Among the most important early retirement benefits are those194 Marcus E. Rebick
offered by disability pensions. Between 1972 and 1991, mature and older
workers have been able to take the disability pension if they experienced diffi-
culty finding jobs. As a result, roughly 13 percent of Swedes ages 55-59 and
more than 30 percent of ages 60-64 were receiving disability pensions in the
late 1980s. This was by far the most popular early retirement program.
4 Dis-
ability pensions given for difficulty in finding jobs will resemble unemploy-
ment insurance in their impact on labor supply. The impact will be even greater,
however, since these pension benefits are typically much larger than those of-
fered by unemployment insurance.
3. Japan allows individuals to collect both unemployment insurance and
public pensions at the same time. Japan currently has the earliest normal retire-
ment age for employees: age 60 for men and age 56 for women. The retirement
age for women is being increased from 56 to 60 over the period from 1986 to
2000. The self-employed, part-time workers, and nonworking spouses have a
normal retirement age of 65. Japan has an earnings test on wage income that
is substantially relaxed after age 65.
5
Japan's pension system provides unequal levels of protection for its entire
population, since the average employee receives benefits starting at age 60 that
are about four times larger than those received by the self-employed starting at
age 65. Families in which the self-employed members are the top earners still
make up almost a quarter of individuals covered directly or indirectly under
the Japanese pension system. For these individuals the pension system offers
very low benefits (table 7.4), well below the minimum poverty line.
7.1.2 Trends in the Levels of Benefits and Extent of Coverage
At present, the replacement rates on Swedish public pensions (57 percent)
are higher on average than in the United States (43 percent) or Japan (42 per-
cent) (Japan 1991, 202-3). As indicated in Table 7.1 through 7.4, however,
there have been some significant changes to the programs offered over time,
changes that could have important implications for labor supply and the timing
of retirement.
Tables 1.2-1 A present evidence on the average level of benefits paid out for
different pension systems over the period from 1960 to the present. Prior to
1970, all three countries increased the coverage of their pension systems.
6
Since the public pension plans pay benefits based on the number of years of
coverage, there is a time lag before the increase in coverage translates into
increases in the number of older workers who have sizable public pension ben-
4. For comparison, the rate of disability recipiency in the United States is only 7 percent of
those eligible for benefits in the age group 55-59. In Sweden, the second most popular program,
the partial pension, was used by some 13 percent of men and 7 percent of women ages 60-64.
5. Appendix A indicates that there are loopholes in the system that allow one to avoid the
earnings test.
6. For a description of these trends, see Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers (1990) for the United
States, Japanese Ministry of Welfare, Jigyo Nenpo, for Japan, and Lagerstrom (1976) for Sweden.195 Social Security and Older Workers' Labor Market Responsiveness
Table 7.2 OASDI" Retiree and Disability: Average Monthly Benefits in the


















































Source: Social Security Administration 1960-1991.
aOASDI = Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance.
Table 7.3 Sweden's Basic Old-Age, Supplementary, Disability, and Partial

























Sources: National Insurance Board (1978, 1983, 1988), Allmdn Fb'rsakring (National Insurance)
(Stockholm).
"All benefit averages were deflated to 1990 kronur and then converted to 1990 dollars.
b1979.
Table 7.4 Japan's Employee Pension and National Pension: Average Monthly























Source: Japanese Ministry of Welfare, Jigyo Nenpo (Annual Report) (Social Insurance Bureau).
"All benefit averages were deflated to 1990 yen and then converted to 1990 dollars.196 Marcus E. Rebick
efits to consider in their retirement decisions. All three countries also increased
the real levels of benefits through the 1970s and, in the case of Sweden and
Japan, in the 1980s as well. The increases in Japan are the most dramatic, with
the employee pension increasing threefold on average. In the United States and
Sweden, the level of old-age benefits doubled over the 1970s. In an exception
to the general trend, Sweden saw a decrease in the average level of benefits
paid out for the partial pension during the period 1980-86 as the government
cut the replacement rate for forgone earnings from 65 percent to 50 percent
over this period.
7.1.3 Financing Arrangements and Their Effect on the Labor Market
Both social security systems and unemployment insurance are supported
through payroll taxes in the three countries. The United States is closest to
being fully funded today, although that was not always the case. Japan is closest
to having a pay-as-you-go system (Clark 1991). In general, payroll tax rates
for public pensions have increased over time in all three countries because of
(1) aging of the population in the presence of less than full funding of social
security, (2) the move toward full funding in the United States, and (3) the
increase in defined benefits relative to real wages. In the first two cases, in-
creases in payroll tax rates may reduce labor supply if the substitution effect
of lower after-tax wage rates dominates the income effect of lower take-home
pay. For the third case, however, the accompanying increase in defined benefits
makes the computation more complex. The aforementioned substitution and
income effects may largely disappear, since there is also an increase in the rate
of deferred compensation in the form of the pension. At the same time, how-
ever, there is an increase in lifetime wealth (from previous years of participa-
tion in the system) that may reduce labor supply. A detailed analysis of the
effects of public pension payroll tax increases is beyond the scope of the paper,
but in general the trends toward increased tax rates should reinforce the effects
on labor supply caused by the increase in benefit levels and coverage.
The United States is the only country with partial experience rating for un-
employment insurance, with the degree of experience rating varying by state.
Experience rating may have some effect on the willingness of firms to lay off
older workers in the case of the United States, and this may be one reason why
movement of older workers out of the U.S. labor force is less likely to be seen
in the form of unemployment.
7.1.4 Private Pension Coverage
Private pensions are important components of compensation in all three
countries, but there are some important differences in terms of their effect on
retirement and of their share of total retirement income. The important differ-
ences from the perspective of his paper are (1) the relative share of private
pensions in postretirement income and (2) the manner in which retirement
wealth accrues to those still working (Kotlikoff and Wise 1989).197 Social Security and Older Workers' Labor Market Responsiveness
In the United States, private pensions exist as both defined benefit plans and
defined contribution plans; the former is still the most prevalent, with 80 per-
cent of all pension plan participants in 1985 (Clark and McDermed 1990, 2).
Defined benefit plans set a retirement date based on either age alone or some
combination of age and service that usually results in a retirement age between
60 and 65. The provisions of private pension plans vary, but the typical U.S.
defined benefit pension plan offers substantial incentives for retirement on
or before the normal retirement date of the Social Security program (Quinn,
Burkhauser, and Myers 1990; Hurd 1990). In 1990, private pensions made up
roughly one-fifth of nonearnings income for individuals over age 65 in the
United States. Social security made up roughly two-fifths of nonearnings in-
come for the same group (Social Security Administration 1960-1991).
In Sweden, private pensions are offered by all employers in the Swedish
Employers' Confederation. Their level of benefits is roughly one-sixth of the
levels offered by the basic and supplementary public pensions. There is no
earnings test on the pensions, and (unlike in the United States) delaying retire-
ment does not delay payment of these pensions. Therefore, their impact on
retirement is likely to be similar to that of the public pensions.
In Japan, employers have the options of making lump-sum payments, offer-
ing fixed-period annuities, or augmenting the level of benefits paid through
the public pension system. These benefits are usually calculated at the age of
mandatory retirement (ages 55 to 60). As a result, working past the age of 60
has no effect on pension wealth, and the private pension system does not offer
direct incentives to retire in the sense of U.S. pensions.
7 Japanese private pen-
sions are also unlikely to provide major incentives to retire by providing greater
economic security. The average lump-sum severance payment represents three
years of base salary, or a lifetime annuity of approximately 22 percent of base
salary.
8 This is approximately one-third the size of the employee pension annu-
ity and not likely to be a major component of income after retirement.
This concludes the overview of economic security systems in the three coun-
tries. The next section begins an examination of the characteristics of the labor
markets of the three countries, looking at secular trends in employment and
labor force participation over the past 20 years.
7.2 Secular Trends in Employment and Participation and Well-being
Table 7.5 gives the labor force participation rates for older men and women
between 1971 and 1990.
9 For the men, the most notable trends are the substan-
7. The augmented portion of the employee pension is not subject to the earnings test.
8. The figures for the size of the lump-sum pension (37.7 months of base salary) come from
Japanese Ministry of Labor (1987), Taishokkin no Shikyu Jittai (Survey of Severance Payments).
The annuity is calculated assuming the individual lives twenty years after mandatory retirement
and the real rate of interest is 4 percent.
9. Five-year averages are used to avoid confusing secular changes with short-term economic
fluctuations.198 Marcus E. Rebick
Table 7.5 Labor Force Participation Rates in the United States, Japan, and





















































































Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Labor Force Sta-
tistics.
tial 5- to 15-point declines in the participation rates for the 60-64, and 65-and-
over age groups in all three countries. U.S. men age 55-59 also show a substan-
tial decline of 7 points in their labor force participation rate. In all three
countries, the trends for women exhibit a sharp contrast to the male trend, with
increasing participation rates for 55- to 64-year-olds in Sweden and for 55- to
59-year-olds in the United States and Japan. The trends for Swedish women
are the most dramatic, with age groups 55-59 and 60-64 showing 21- and 15-
point increases, respectively, over the past two decades. Finally, Japan is nota-
ble for having higher labor force participation rates than the other countries.
Japan's labor force participation rates in the 65-and-older age group were the
highest among the seven largest economies in the OECD.
1
0
10. A problem with the Japanese figures stems from the extent of self-employment in Japan.
The extent to which the self-employed are actually working is open to question (Rebick 1993).199 Social Security and Older Workers' Labor Market Responsiveness
Turning to trends in unemployment, table 7.6 gives a matching set of age-
specific unemployment rates. Unemployment rates have been fairly steady in
the United States and Sweden over the 1970-90 period, although the early
1980s were a period of higher unemployment. The unemployment rates of both
Japanese men and women show a rising secular trend over this period, espe-
cially for men in the 60-64-year-old age group. In Sweden, there is a drop in
the unemployment rate for older men after the mid-1970s that corresponds to
the lowering of the normal retirement age from 67 to 65 in 1976. At the same
time, unemployment insurance benefits were restricted to those under the age
of 65.
The secular trends in labor force participation for older men can be imputed
to rising private and public pension levels and to increased pension coverage.
The trends for women seem to be related to the increased labor force participa-
tion rates of women in more recent birth cohorts (Laczko and Phillipson 1991)
and to the fact that women typically have poorer pension benefits because pen-
Table 7.6 Unemployment Rates in the United States, Japan, and Sweden, by





















































































Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Labor Force Sta-
tistics200 Marcus E. Rebick
sion levels are tied to length of employment and wage levels. On the other
hand, the trends in the unemployment rates in Sweden and Japan seem to come
in part from changes in public support programs. In Japan the 60-64 age group
receives better benefits today than in 1970, while in Sweden unemployment
benefits for those over the age of 65 have been eliminated.
The effects the increased benefits from the social programs have on well-
being are not in doubt. All three countries have seen substantial declines in the
poverty rates of older groups. Table 7.7 shows the trends in poverty rates for
older groups in each of the three countries over time. Although the poverty
measures are not necessarily comparable between the three countries, the table
does indicate that the trend toward lower poverty among the older groups of
the population have been similar in all three countries.
A question of importance in the discussion of well-being is the issue of who
retires early. Studies in the United States (Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers 1990)
and Japan (Seike 1989) indicate that the less healthy and the more poorly edu-
cated tend to retire earliest, other things equal. Although these studies suggest
that the social protection programs are effective in reaching the least advan-




























































Sources: Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60: No. 95, table 1; No.
106, table 11; No. 133, table 11; No. 158, table 7. Japan: Preston and Kono 1988, table 11.6.
Sweden: Erikson and Fritzell 1988, table 12.3.
"Percentage below official absolute poverty line (post-1969 definition).
bPercentage below relative poverty line (one-half medial disposable income of whole population).
'Percentage of Japanese living in households with monthly expenditures less than $509 (1990
U.S. dollars).201 Social Security and Older Workers' Labor Market Responsiveness
taged, other evidence in the United States also shows that the lowest-paid
workers are least likely to retire early, probably because their total wealth in-
cluding pensions is insufficient (Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers). This suggests
that the social protection programs may be inadequate in providing protection
for some of the neediest.
A more difficult question is the extent to which the programs ameliorate the
income losses experienced with job loss. In order to examine this question
carefully, analysis of longitudinal data is required. One study of the 1969-79
decade in the United States found that 11 percent of couples without pensions
fell into poverty during the one- to two-year period immediately following
retirement (Burkhauser and Duncan 1988). At the same transition, only 2 per-
cent of those with pensions fell into poverty, illustrating the importance of
private pensions as a supplement to social security. The evidence from Sweden
given in table 7.7 also suggests that improvements in the level of social security
and unemployment benefits lowered the poverty rates for the mature and older
unemployed between 1967 and 1980. The poverty rate for not-employed single
individuals over age 45 fell from 17 percent to 5 percent.
In conclusion, it appears that the increase in coverage and levels of benefits
in all three countries was successful in achieving the goal of greater social
protection. At the same time, the labor force participation rates for men fell,
possibly as a result of these changes in social benefits.
7.3 Cyclical Movements in Employment Levels of Older Workers
This section looks at the extent to which employment and participation
movements over the business cycle are more severe for the older age groups.
As mentioned earlier, Japan and Sweden offer better job protection for younger
and prime-age workers. One way to see how strongly unemployment hits dif-
ferent demographic groups is to look at cross-sectional profiles of the age
structure of unemployment. Figure 7.1 shows the unemployment profiles for
men and women in the G7 countries and Sweden during 1987. It is apparent
that there is considerable variation across countries in the extent to which un-
employment is concentrated in the older age groups. The United States, Italy,
and Japanese women show relatively low unemployment rates for older partici-
pants, while Japanese men, Sweden, France, West Germany, and the United
Kingdom show relatively high unemployment rates for older participants in
comparison with prime-age participants.
The variation in the age structure of unemployment across countries may be
due to differences in the methods of providing benefits to nonworking individ-
uals. For example, the relatively high unemployment rates for older people in
Sweden and Japan may actually reflect retirement from the labor force, when
unemployment benefits are used in addition to or in place of pensions as an
income support for those who stop working. In order to avoid the reporting
problems that result from differences in protection programs in the three coun-





















7.1 Unemployment rates for G7 countries and Sweden in 1987, by age
OECD, Labor Force Statistics.
pation rates over the business cycle. In this way, fluctuations in the numbers of
discouraged workers may also be considered.
Adopting a method used by Clark and Summers (1981), I use a simple time
series analysis to analyze employment fluctuations by different demographic
groups over the business cycle. Clark and Summers developed this method
explicitly to compare the differential response of different demographic groups
to business conditions in the United States, assuming that some groups will
exhibit stronger discouraged-worker effects than other. Using their approach,
I focus on the employment/population ratio rather than the unemployment rate
as an indicator of labor movements over the business cycle. Decomposition of
the employment/population ratio into the employment rate and the labor force
participation rate yields:
(1) log EJNit = log E.JPit + log PJNit,
where Ek is employment, iVit is the population, and Pit represents participants for the ith demographic group at time 1.1 then examine the cyclical movements
in all of the terms, using current and lagged values of the unemployment rate
of prime-age males (who show the strongest attachment to the labor force) as
a measure of the business cycle:
(2)
(3)
log E.JN.A = a0 + X a
log EJPk = 30 + 2 ^ UR_J+l
+*25t
+ 3251 + et203 Social Security and Older Workers' Labor Market Responsiveness
(4) log PJNit = yo + Zy} URr_j+l + y251 + et,
where UR refers to the unemployment rate of prime-age males, defined as 35-
to 44-year-old men in the case of the United States and Sweden and 30- to 39-
year-old men for Japan. The sums 2 c^ and 2 fy and 2 y} of the coefficients on
the current and lagged values of UR will then show the respective percentage
responses of the employment/population ratio, the employment rate, and the
labor force participation rate to a one-point change in the unemployment rate
of prime-age males over the long run. The use of lagged terms allows for
longer-term adjustments to shocks in the business cycle, including adjustment
costs and the role of future expectations.
An advantage of using the unemployment rate of prime-age males as an
explanatory variable, rather than a more conventional measure such as de-
trended output, is that there is less reason to expect a simultaneous equation
bias." In addition, I am able to examine the relative response of the older
groups to a labor market measure of the business cycle. The labor force partici-
pation rate of prime-age males is unlikely to show a major response to cyclical
fluctuations, and so the unemployment rate of prime-age males provides a use-
ful metric by which the responsiveness of other groups can be measured. If
other groups show a response similar in magnitude to that of prime-age work-
ers, then the sums of the coefficients on the contemporaneous and lagged un-
employment rates of prime-age men should come to approximately minus-one
for the employment/population ratio and the employment rate, and zero for the
labor force participation rate. These sums represent the long-run response of
different demographic groups to the business cycle.
I use a monthly deseasonalized time series
1
2 and twelve monthly lags in my
estimations.
1
3 As in Clark and Summers (1981), I include a time trend to allow
for secular shifts in the average participation and employment rates. I model
the error structure as an AR1 process, and use a maximum-likelihood proce-
dure (TSP) to estimate the generalized least-squares model.
1
4 The lagged vari-
ables are estimated using an Almon distributed lag model of order 6 for ease
in estimation.
1
5 I report more details on the results of the regressions them-
selves in appendix B. For ease of exposition, I show only the estimates of the
long-run responses X Oj and 2 fy and 2 ^ in table 7.8. In each case I have
11.1 have also repeated the procedure using the detrended growth in gross domestic product as
a measure of the business cycle. Although the results for specific demographic groups are slightly
different, the overall conclusions of the paper are not affected. These results are available from
the author on request.
12. The time series span the period 1949-92 for the United States, 1976-92 for Sweden, and
1962-92 for Japan.
13. Increasing the number of lags slightly increases the size of the long-run response but does
not affect the overall conclusions of the paper.
14. A simultaneous equations model was also estimated with the cross-equation restriction that
the long-run responses obey the identity in equation (1). The basic results of the paper remain
the same.










Cyclical Response of Participation and Employment: United











































































































Sources: United States: Employment and Earnings. Japan: Labor Force Survey. Sweden: Labor
Force Survey.
Note: Figures reported in the table are sums of coefficients of prime-age male contemporary
and eleven lagged unemployment rates in regressions where the dependent variables are the
log(employment/population rate), log(employment rate), and log(participation rate) for different
age groups. Results are multiplied by 100 X the detrended standard deviation of the explanatory
variable for comparability across countries. Prime-age males are 35-44 in the United States and
Sweden and 30-39 in Japan. All data are deseasonalized, monthly observations covering the pe-
riod from 1949 to 1991 for the United States, 1962 to 1991 for Japan, and 1976 to 1991 for
Sweden. A time trend and constant term are included in all regressions. The Japanese regressions
include an additional dummy variable set to one for the period after October 1967, when the
methods of the Labor Force Survey changed. Regressions correct for AR1 autocorrelation using a
maximum likelihood procedure. Details of estimates are shown in appendix B.
aThe estimates are for the period 1976-1985 in the case of men and women over age 65.
bLFPR = Labor Force Participation Rate.
*Significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.205 Social Security and Older Workers' Labor Market Responsiveness
multiplied these estimates by one standard deviation in the detrended un-
employment rate of prime-age males, the explanatory variable used to rep-
resent the business cycle. The two age groups that I analyze are mature, de-
fined as ages 55 to 64, and older, defined as over 65.
The results given in table 7.8 indicate some differences in the behavior of
mature and older workers across the three countries. For the employment/pop-
ulation variable, the overall Japanese response is significantly larger than that
of the United States, for all women and older men. The differences are much
more striking for the older groups. This is interesting, given that the standard
deviation in prime-age male unemployment (measured in percentage terms) is
much smaller in Japan at 0.3 than in the United States at 1.23. Similarly, Swe-
den shows larger responses than the United States for men and mature women
and no significant difference for older men. Again, this is interesting in light
of the fact that in Sweden, one standard deviation in the prime-age male unem-
ployment rate is only 0.7. Japan and Sweden, countries known for stable em-
ployment and low unemployment, rely on their mature and older workers for
a substantial proportion of flexibility in aggregate employment levels.
1
6 De-
spite this tendency, however, the absolute size of the response to the business
cycle of the mature groups in these two low-unemployment countries is only
slightly larger than that seen in the United States.
1
7
Looking at the breakdown of the response in the employment/population
ratio into the employment/labor force ratio and the labor force participation
rate (LFPR), it is clear that the unemployment age profiles of figure 7.1 by
themselves do not accurately portray the relative response of mature and older
groups. This is especially true for women and older men in Japan and older
men in Sweden, where the fluctuations in the labor force participation rates
dominate the response in the overall employment/population ratio. The LFPR
response is not statistically significant for any of the older groups in the United
States, but the results shown here indicate that this is not a universal phe-
nomenon.
Although the behavior over the business cycle of Japanese, Swedish and
U.S. labor markets for mature and older workers are substantially different, it
is unlikely that all of these differences are related to supply-side effects gener-
16. Abraham and Houseman (1989) and Hashimoto (1993) note that the relative importance of
hours reductions for labor input flexibility is greater in Japan than in the United States, especially
over the short run. The data that I am using do not allow me to investigate this factor for separate
demographic groups. Hashimoto also reports on the importance of kyugyosha, workers who are
sent home on reduced pay during slack business periods. These workers are not unemployed from
the perspective of economic security since they remain employed by their firms, but the prevalence
of the practice indicates that the flexibility of labor input is greater than simple hours and unem-
ployment rate fluctuations would indicate. The same paper estimates that the kyugyosha may rep-
resent up to 2 percent of the labor force during economic downturns.
17. For similar results from a comparison of Germany and the United States, see Abraham and
Houseman (1993), pages 110-14.206 Marcus E. Rebick
ated by the social security benefits offered by the different countries. The avail-
ability of benefits will not affect behavior over the business cycle unless wages
are lowered during downturns to induce workers to leave their jobs. Rather,
total business cycle response of the employment/population ratio will be re-
lated to demand-side factors such as whether or not firms preferentially fire
older workers during business downturns.
1
8 The effect of social programs will
primarily be to determine the breakdown of the employment/population re-
sponse into employment and labor force participation responses. For example,
the relative importance of the labor force participation response for mature
men in Sweden and Japan (in comparison with the United States) may be due
to the fact that it is easier to take public pensions in these countries and then
return to work without penalty. In the U.S. case, the early retirement pension
lowers Social Security benefits for the rest of the retiree's life and will be sub-
ject to an earnings test if the individual returns to work.
To account for the difference in overall response on the demand side, it is
necessary to look beyond the social security programs to other institutions in
the labor markets of these countries. In the United States, age discrimination-
discouraging legislation and the seniority preference system of unions make
older U.S. workers less vulnerable in comparison with their Japanese counter-
parts. The steepness of seniority-earnings profiles in Japan also provides a
stronger financial incentive for Japanese firms to dismiss their older workers if
the compensation for the oldest workers is greater than their value to the firm.
If firms have specific investments in all workers, then dismissal of older work-
ers during downturns would be rational since their asset value to the firm is
lower, given the shortness of the remainder of their working life. Finally, older
workers are less likely to be a deliberate target of company dismissal policy
when, as in the United States, they have lower participation rates, even in the
best economic conditions.
In Sweden, older workers are explicitly protected by legislation drafted dur-
ing the 1970s, a period of many plant closings. Workers over the age of
45 must be given six months notice of dismissal, and employers must try to
find other jobs for those who have lost the ability to perform their usual jobs
(Ginsberg 1985). In addition, Swedish unions use a seniority rule for layoffs,
also protecting their older workers.
Some evidence on the extent to which labor market responses may have been
affected on the supply side by economic security programs may be inferred by
looking at participation and employment responses during periods when the
benefits available were different from those offered today. This is the subject
of the next section.
18. It is possible that personnel management practices may be affected by the availability of
benefits—it is easier both psychologically and politically to fire workers if they will be provided
for. This point is emphasized in OECD (1992a).207 Social Security and Older Workers' Labor Market Responsiveness
7.4 Changes in the Pattern of Response over Time within Countries
To examine changes in the response pattern of demographic groups, I mod-
ify models (2), (3), and (4) used in the previous section to allow for different
subperiods to be examined. This is done by interacting a dummy variable set
equal to zero in the first subperiod and one in the second subperiod, with the
lagged prime-age male unemployment rates and the time trend to generate an
additional set of thirteen terms. If the sum of the twelve coefficients on the
interactive unemployment rate terms is not significantly different from zero,
then we can conclude that the null hypothesis, that there is no difference in
business cycle response between the two periods, is supported by the data.
1
9
In table 7.9, I report the results of this procedure for the United States and
Japan.
2
0 The two subperiods chosen for the United States are 1949-75 and
1977-92. The size of pension benefits increased in real terms until 1975 and
then remained constant. Therefore, the 1977-92 period represents a period of
higher benefits, where we should expect to see an increase in the response of
the employment/population ratio if social protection programs are responsible
for the kinds of response shown in table 7.8. For Japan, the two periods covered
are 1962-75, and 1977-92, the latter period having much higher public pension




For each country in table 7.9, the column on the left shows the response of
the dependent variable to the contemporaneous and lagged levels of prime-age
male unemployment for the first subperiod, just as table 7.8 showed the re-
sponse over the entire sample period. The right-hand column then shows the
change in the response that occurs in the second period, and its significance.
The actual second-period response point estimate would be given by the sum
of the point estimates in the two columns. For example, mature men in the
United States show a statistically significant employment/population response
of -1.18 from 1949 to 1975. From 1977 to 1992 the response was -1.37
(—1.18 - 0.19), but the change between the two periods was not significant,
as the standard error of .60 for the —.19 change indicates.
The U.S. results indicate that mature and older women have seen some in-
crease in the responsiveness of their employment/population ratio response to
fluctuations in the prime-age male unemployment rate, but the results have low
significance. This effect comes from an increased response in their labor force
participation rate. At the same time, the response of the employment/labor
19. The model actually used for estimation is slightly more complex, in that I include a third
set of interactions to cover the one-year period after the beginning of the second period in order
to remove a one-year transition from consideration and to sharpen the statistical test.
20. Sweden does not have age-specific employment and participation data available prior to
1970, and the brevity of the period 1970-76 makes analysis using time series difficult. Conse-
quently, this section presents results for only Japan and the United States.
21. The detailed results of the regressions are provided in supplementary tables available from
the author.208 Marcus E. Rebick
Table 7.9 Cyclical Response of Participation and Employment, United States


















































































































































Sources: United States: Employment and Earnings. Japan: Labor Force Survey. Sweden: Labor
Force Survey.
Note: Figures reported in columns 1 and 3 of the table are sums of coefficients of prime-age male
contemporary and eleven lagged monthly unemployment rates in regressions where the dependent
variables are log(participation rate), log(employment rate), and log(employment ratio) for different
age groups. Columns 2 and 4 contain the sums of the coefficients on the lagged prime-age male
unemployment rates interacted with a dummy variable set equal to one during the second period.
In addition, there is a time trend and set of lagged variables interacted with a dummy variable for a
transition period of one year between the two main periods. For other details, see table 7.8. Detailed
results available from the author.
*Significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.209 Social Security and Older Workers' Labor Market Responsiveness
force ratio has significantly declined, partly offsetting the increase in the par-
ticipation response. The size of this significant decline in the response of the
employment/labor force ratio, however, is smaller than the (less significant)
increase in the response of the labor force participation rate. Mature U.S. men
show a similar decline in the employment/labor force response, but overall
there is no significant change in their employment/population ratio respon-
siveness. Older U.S. men show a significant decline in both participation and
employment responses during the second period.
Turning to the estimates for Japan, mature Japanese men show an increase
in their employment/population response after 1975, mainly from an increased
response in the participation rate. Mature and older Japanese women as well
as older Japanese men show a significant decrease in their employment/popu-
lation response, also coming from a decline in the participation response. The
data used here indicate that changes in the unemployment insurance legislation
in 1975 did not give rise to a major increase in the unemployment response of
older groups. Increases in the level of benefits in the employee pension system
may have doubled the participation response of mature Japanese men, but the
absolute size of this effect remains small—an increase in prime-age male un-
employment of one standard deviation now yields a 0.7-point drop in the labor
force participation rate of mature men as opposed to the 0.3-point drop it
would have yielded in the years 1962-75.
In conclusion, evidence from employment series taken by different sub-
periods provides little evidence that introduction and/or extension of social
benefit programs for older workers has greatly increased the responsiveness of
their employment rates over the business cycle. The exceptions to this may be
mature Japanese men, a group that showed significantly higher responses in
the employment/population ratio after 1975, and U.S. women, who show some
evidence of a greater discouraged-worker effect after 1975. In the next section,
I look directly at fluctuations in the rate of participation in pension and unem-
ployment benefits over the business cycle.
7.5 Participation in Public Support Benefits over the Cycle
This section of the paper examines the use of public support programs over
the past twenty to thirty years in the three countries. In particular, I distinguish
secular and cyclical trends and attempt to look at the impact of changes in
legislation during the period. In general, my procedure is to regress the per-
centage of individuals in a given age group that are receiving benefits on the
unemployment rate of prime-age men and a time trend.
2
2 Since most of the
data on benefits are only available as annual data, I use only current unemploy-
ment rates of prime-age men as an explanatory variable.
22. For the United States, I use the fraction of those eligible for benefits that receive them (the
take-up rate).210 Marcus E. Rebick
7.5.1 United States
Table 7.10 displays the results for the United States. Women show a positive
correlation between participation in the old-age pension for both the 62-64
age group and the 65-69 age group, but the significance level is not high. Men
only show a low-significance positive response for the over-65 age group.
More important than the significance levels, the estimated elasticity of the re-
sponse is very low. There is little change in participation in Social Security
benefits over the business cycle. Recipients of disability pensions also show
no variation over the business cycle. As expected, unemployment insurance
recipients in the 55-64 age group are positively correlated with the prime-age
male unemployment rate, but the elasticities are less than one for both men
and women (which is consistent with the results on the employment rate from
column 2 in table 7.8). I conclude that with the exception of unemployment
insurance, U.S. old-age, survivors, and disability insurance (OASDI) is un-
likely to have had much effect on the fluctuations in employment of mature
















Cyclical and Secular Changes in Benefit Participation Rates: United
States, 1960-1987 (dependent variable is the log of the fraction of


























































































Sources: Social Security Administration, Annual Statistical Supplements; Employment and Earn-
ings; Labor Force Statistics Derived from the Current Population Survey, 1948-87, U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor Bulletin 2307.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
"1981 is not included for disability pensions.
*Significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.211 Social Security and Older Workers' Labor Market Responsiveness
7.5.2 Sweden
The evidence for Sweden is shown in table 7.11, using data for the period
1975-88. Evidence is shown only for the various pension programs. The up-
take of the basic and supplementary old-age pension increases during periods
of high unemployment; the elasticity of response is statistically indistinguish-
able from one. Although the participation in disability benefits among 60 to
64-year-olds shows no statistically significant correlation with prime-age male
unemployment, new participation of individuals claiming disability pensions
on the basis of labor market difficulties does show a significant positive re-
sponse for women and, to a lesser degree of significance, for men as well. The
elasticities are statistically indistinguishable from one. In all cases, the secular
trends for participation in these benefits are positive.
The estimates for the partial pension system show no significant correlation
between the business cycle and participation in benefits. The declining secular
Table 7.11 Cyclical and Secular Changes in Benefit Participation Rates: Sweden,
1976-1988 (dependent variable is the log of the fraction of the
































































































Sources: Sweden Labor Force Survey; National Social Insurance Board, Allmdn Forsakring, (Na-
tional Insurance), (Stockholm).
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
"1970-1988.
"1977-1988.
*Significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.212 Marcus E. Rebick
trend in the participation rate for men reflects the fact that benefit levels were
cut back from 65 percent replacement of the reduction in earnings to 50 per-
cent of the reduction in earnings between 1980 and 1986. Given the limited
number of observations, changes in the replacement rates may overwhelm any
observable effect from the business cycle for this pension plan.
7.5.3 Japan
The results for Japan are shown in table 7.12. The number of pension recipi-
ents and the number of unemployment insurance recipients both show a posi-
tive elasticity with respect to the unemployment rate of prime-age men, but the
unemployment insurance (UI) recipients show a substantially higher elasticity.
The earnings test-reduced pension shows negative elasticities of the recipient
rate with respect to the unemployment rate (as would be expected).
As the time trend coefficient estimates indicate, the rates of employee pen-
Table 7.12 Cyclical and Secular Changes in Benefit Participation Rates: Japan,
1981-1990 (dependent variable is the log of the fraction of the demographic


































































































Sources: Unemployment rates and population figures: Labor Force Survey. Numbers of benefits recipi-
ents: Social Insurance Bureau, Jigyo Nenpo; Japanese Ministry of Labor Employment Insurance Annual
Report.
Note: A dummy variable set to one for the period 1985-90 is used in the regression for the unemployment
recipient rate, since recipients over age 65 are included in the period 1975 to 1984. Standard errors in pa-
rentheses.
a1976-1990.
*Significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.213 Social Security and Older Workers' Labor Market Responsiveness
sion participation for both men and women increased over the 1980s, reflecting
the decline in labor force participation over this period, the increased availabil-
ity of pensions for women, and the decline in self-employment by cohort. The
UI recipient rate also shows a declining trend over time, with a sharp drop in
1985 when UI benefits were cut back.
From these observations we can conclude that both pensions and unemploy-
ment benefits are used for income support during downturns in the business
cycle. Since both the employee pension and unemployment insurance may be
collected at the same time, this is not surprising.
In conclusion, the participation rates in most of the social benefits increase
with downturns in the business cycle, in accordance with the labor market
responses estimated in section 7.3. Notable exceptions are the actuarially re-
duced early retirement schemes in the United States and Sweden. In these
cases, there are no financial advantages to receiving the benefits, so workers
may prefer to wait and find work, in the U.S. case, or take benefits from another
program, as in the Swedish case. Finally, there is no evidence that the benefits
have affected the decision whether or not to work during economic downturns.
7.6 Conclusions
In this study, I examined the extent to which government labor market pro-
grams, including early retirement programs, are used by older individuals in
the United States, Japan, and Sweden in response to economic fluctuations. I
found that these programs are more heavily used by workers in Sweden and
Japan, where the responsiveness of older demographic groups to economic
conditions is greater than that shown by older groups in the United States.
There has been a significant decrease in poverty rates of older demographic
groups over the time period in which these programs were expanded. This
suggests that these programs have had a major impact in improving the well-
being of older individuals.
Previous research indicated that the introduction of social programs for the
elderly affected overall trends in participation of older workers. This paper
shows that there is no conclusive evidence that introduction of these programs
had major effects on the labor market responsiveness of the older demographic
groups, in terms of fluctuations in employment over the business cycle. Labor
market responsiveness varies among the three countries for a variety of rea-
sons, likely related to differences in institutions that constrain a firm's ability
to adjust its demand for labor of different demographic groups. Consequently,
evaluation of programs for older individuals should concentrate on their long-
run impact on labor force participation rates and on the efficiency with which
they improve economic security, rather than on their impact on labor market
flexibility.214 Marcus E. Rebick
Appendix A
Description of Unemployment and Pension Programs
Foster (1990) provides a good survey of general information on employee ben-
efits in the United States and Sweden. For Japan, see Japanese Ministry of
Welfare, Outline of Social Insurance in Japan (Social Insurance Agency).
United States
The United States offers both unemployment insurance and old-age pension
benefits to older retirees. Normal retirement benefits begin at age 65 in the
United States, with early retirement benefits available from age 62. Formerly
it was possible for a retiree to collect both a pension and unemployment insur-
ance at the same time, although this depended on individual state practice.
Since 1980, this has not been possible in any state (Hamermesh 1980).
Unemployment Insurance. Unemployment insurance benefits are available
only to employees who have lost their jobs involuntarily. Unemployment insur-
ance benefits replace 50 percent of earnings (up to a maximum of $419 per
week in 1990 dollars).
Public Pensions. Pensions are calculated on a formula based on "average in-
dexed monthly earnings," which provides a replacement ratio that varies in-
versely with the level of earnings. There is a ceiling on covered earnings
($51,300 in 1990). Early retirement benefits are available as early as age 62,
with an actuarial reduction of 0.9 percent in the benefit level for each month
they are taken before age 65. The pension computation also includes an earn-
ings test that reduces benefits by one-half of the income earned over a mini-
mum threshold ($6,840 in 1990), for those aged 62 to 64. The earnings test
reduction rate is lowered to one-third after age 65, while the minimum thresh-
old is raised.
Sweden
In comparison with the United States and Japan, Sweden offers the widest
range of different support programs for retirees, including early receipt of pub-
lic pensions at reduced benefit levels, partial pensions (for part-time workers),
unemployment insurance, and disability pensions.
National Pension. Public pensions of a national basic pension (AFP) of fixed
value calculated from a base amount paid to every Swedish resident at retire-
ment along with the national supplementary pension (ATP) with benefits re-
lated to earnings during preretirement years. There is a ceiling (7.5 times the215 Social Security and Older Workers' Labor Market Responsiveness
base amount) on pensionable earnings. The full pension for thirty years of
insured earnings is set at 60 percent of the average of the pensionable income
for the fifteen best years. The normal retirement age in Sweden is 65 (67 prior
to 1976), and there is an option for early retirement at age 60 (62 before 1976).
There is no earnings test for pensions in Sweden.
Partial Pensions. This program has been available since 1976. Between ages
60 and 64, workers whose hours are reduced by at least five hours per week
are eligible for the partial pension if they have ten years of pensionable income
since age 45. The pension replaces 65 percent of the earnings lost by reducing
hours (50 percent between 1980 and 1987), not counting any reduction in the
wage rate that may accompany the reduction in working hours. For those who
enroll in this program, there is no reduction in regular pension benefits after
age 65.
Disability Pensions. This pension provides for the loss of at least 50 percent
of earnings capacity or permanent unemployment after age 60. The latter pro-
vision was abolished in 1991. The pension pays between 50 percent and 100
percent of the retirement pension, according to the degree of disability.
Unemployment Insurance. Two kinds of benefits are available: unemployment
insurance, and labor market assistance. Unemployment insurance benefits
range from $16 to $50 per day and are available for 450 days for those over the
age of 55. Labor market assistance is available after unemployment insurance
benefits run out; it pays $19 per day. Between age 55 and 59, these are available
for 300 days. After age 60, they are available until age 65. Unlike the case of
Japan, any pensions received from the social security system or a private plan
are subtracted from the benefit.
Japan
Japan offers two major kinds of public assistance programs that could be
used for early retirement: unemployment insurance and public pensions.
Unemployment Insurance. Unemployment insurance benefits replace between
60 percent and 80 percent of wage earnings up to a maximum benefit ($37 per
day in 1989). In order for a person to qualify for benefits, they must have been
covered by the system for at least six months prior to leaving their job. They
must also report to a public employment center for help with job placement.
Unemployed individuals are not required to take a job that pays less than 60
percent of the most recent wage, that pays less than the unemployment benefit,
that is unsuitable for the person's skills, or that involves an unreasonable com-
mute or change of residence. In practice, most public employment offices are
not strict about forcing beneficiaries to engage in job search.216 Marcus E. Rebick
Benefits are paid for up to 300 days in the case of 45- to 65-year-olds, al-
though the period of benefits is tied to tenure at the last job (with the exception
of the period between 1975 and 1984). There are also possible extensions to
the 300-day maximum in the case of individuals whose circumstances make it
especially difficult for them to find new work.
Public Pensions. The main public pension for private sector employees is the
employee pension, part of the national pension program. The employee pension
is available to women at age 56 and to men at age 60. The pension is computed
on a formula that includes a fixed part and a part that is proportional to the
average wages earned during the time that the individual has been enrolled in
the system:
Pension = (at + [a2 • Average wage]) • Months of coverage • COLA ,
where COLA refers to a cost-of-living adjustment. There is a cap on months
of coverage (480 in 1990) and a cap on monthly wages that are used for the
computation of the average wage ($2,807 in 1989). The major reforms of the
early 1970s doubled the size of the fixed coefficient a, in real terms. More
important, past wages were substantially revalued to take account of both in-
flation and economic growth. This led to a substantial increase in the real value
of the pensions. A second factor increasing real values of the pension after
1973 has been the increase in the coverage period for the average individual as
the pension system matured.
There is an earnings test (substantially relaxed after age 65). Up to age 64,
at selected earnings cutoff points, the pension is reduced by fixed percentages
with 100 percent of the pension lost when monthly earnings exceed $1,159 in
1990 dollars. The Japanese earnings test produces a fairly flat budget constraint
(with notches) up to the point where benefits are reduced to zero. The earnings
test is not applied, however, to those employees who are employed for less
than three-fifths of normal working hours in the firm. Also, bonuses are not
considered earnings from the perspective of the public pension system. By
increasing the bonus portion of pay, employers can keep covered earnings be-
low the earnings test points, even in the case where employees are working full
time (Rebick 1993). There is no reliable statistical evidence on how wide-
spread this practice is.217 Social Security and Older Workers' Labor Market Responsiveness
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Cyclical Response of Participation, Employment, and Employment/













































































































































Sources: U.S. Population Bureau, Employment and Earnings, (monthly series), 1949 to March
1992.
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the participation rate, employment rate, or
employment/population ratio for the demographic group. "Sum Lagged" refers to the sum of the
coefficients on the current and lagged unemployment rates of prime-age males (age 35-44) over
the last year. "Trend" is a simple time trend. Regressions were estimated using TSP's AR1 proce-
dure, maximum likelihood method. Standard errors lie below the regression coefficients estimates.
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Source: Labor Force Survey (monthly series), January 1975 to March 1992.
Note: See note to table 7B.1 for details of estimation.
a The estimates are for 1976-85 in the case of the older (65 + ) men and women.
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Source: Monthly Labor Survey (monthly series), September 1960 to March 1992.
Note: Prime-age males are age 30-39. Constant 1 is a dummy variable set to one from October
1967. For other details, see note to table 7B.1.
a LFPR = Labor Force Participation Rate.220 Marcus E. Rebick
Appendix C
Statistical Sources
All data used in this paper are available to the public, mainly through pub-
lished documents.
United States
Labor force data from the Current Population Survey are published monthly
in Employment and Earnings by the U.S. Population Bureau. All data used on
the benefit levels and participation in benefits come from the Annual Statistical
Supplement of the Social Security Administration.
Sweden
Monthly labor force data are from the Swedish Labor Force Survey. These
are not published but are available from Statistiska centralbyran, AM-
avdelningen, 115 81 Stockholm. Data on benefits and participation in benefits
come from an annual publication Allmdn Forsdkring {National Insurance),
published by the National Insurance Board, Stockholm.
Japan
Monthly labor force data after 1968 are available from the Japanese Labor
Force Survey. This is published as annual volumes by the Japanese Ministry of
Labor. For monthly data before 1968, it is necessary to use the monthly reports
put out by the same ministry. Data on the level of benefits and participation in
benefits may be found in the Jigyo Nenpo (Annual Report), an annual volume
published by the Social Insurance Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Welfare.
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